Summary
INTRODUCTION
The negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), in the mid-1990s, has contributed to shape global trade of agri-food products. In particular, tariffs have been substantially reduced, while non-tariff measures (NTMs) have been increased. The proliferation of NTMs has led to a less transparent policy environment: the effects on trade have not been fully investigated nor clarified (Arita et al., 2017; Fernandes et al., 2017) . This is true, in particular, for wine sector, where high levels of tariffs and bilateral NTMs coexist: wine trade is overregulated, and the level of overall intervention has been steady for years (Foster and Spencer, 2002; Anderson a and Golin, 2004) . Plausibly, governments tend to seek additional revenues through tariffs, standards and bilateral NTMs (Schnabel and Storchmann, 2010; Storchmann, 2012) .
A large literature has investigated the influence of NTMs on trade of agri-food products, and has provided mixed evidence: NTMs may be barriers (e.g. Anders and Caswell, 2009; Peterson et al., 2013; Ferro et al., 2015) or catalysts (e.g. de Frahan and Vancauteren, 2006; Cardamone, 2011) for trade. Only few studies investigate if and how NTMs affect wine trade: Olper and Raimondi (2008) estimate the effect of NTMs on trade of processed food (e.g. spirits, wine, malt, drinks, oils and fats, milling products, bakery, etc.), concluding that NTMs play a trade reduction effect; on global trade of bottled wine, Dal Bianco et al. (2016) find that Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) do not seem to obstruct exports, while Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) have heterogeneous impacts on trade; Meloni and Swinnen (2017a, b) investigate the impact of standards in wine trade between France and Greece, and conclude that standards reduced Greek exports. The limited empirical literature and the contrasting evidence on the effects of NTMs (and of bilateral trade agreements) on wine trade call for more investigation: are bilateral NTMs tradeenhancing or trade-impeding? Which measures are the most (and the least) influential? Are these effects heterogeneous across different segments of the wine market?
By adopting a gravity model approach, we investigate how and to what extent bilateral NTMs influence global imports of wine. In particular, we disentangle the contribution of bilateral NTMs mostly implemented on wine imports (SPSs, TBTs, pre-shipment inspections, export-related measures). We also discriminate the global effects of NTMs for different market segments of wine: sparkling, bottled, bulk, and musts. We focus on main exporters and main importers, and on trade that occurred from 1991 to 2016.
The novelty of our paper derives by the level of details we reach in classifying trade regulations and market segments. The detailed analysis allows us to identify which regulation is the most influential, and which segments tend to react more to bilateral trade regulations.
NON-TARIFF MEASURES AND TRADE: EVIDENCE FROM WINE SECTOR
A rapid and dynamic evolution has affected wine sector in recent decades, driven by changes in demand (Castillo et al., 2016) , geographical redistribution of consumption (Aizenman and Brooks, 2008; Anderson and Nelgen, 2015) direction of trade flows (Mariani et al., 2012) , and complementary determinants, such as novel types of policy interventions (Dal Bianco et al., 2016) .
We consider wine imports of 24 countries and four market segments (sparkling, bottled, and bulk wines, and musts) (table 1): they cover more than 90% of global imports and exports' values and of global production volumes (Anderson and Pinnilla, 2017) . They include developed (North, 62%) and developing (South, 38%) countries (United Nations, 2017), and are representative of Old World Producers (OWP, 46%) and New World Producers (NWP, 54%) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2015) .Comparing average values of imports and exports 1 , countries may be classified as net importers (NI, 62%) and net exporters (NE, 38%) (UN Comtrade, 2017). Imports show a notable growth in the period 1991-2008,due to increased consumption in nonproducing countries, and a recover in 2011 after a reduction in 2009, due to the international economic crisis (figure 1). Indeed, domestic consumption of OWP have gradually reduced overtime, while new world consumers (e.g. Asian countries) have recently emerged (Anderson, 2013; Anderson and Wittwer, 2015) .
Emblematic is the case of China, whose consumption has increased from 5 to 16 million hl in a decade (from 2006 to 2016) . In addition, volumes of production of OWP have been rather steady, whereas NWP have exponentially increased their production and exported quantities (from 78 to 7,885 million U.S.$ in 1986-2016) (Anderson and Pinilla, 2017) . Comparing the evolution of average values of imports across decades (table 2), we find the highest increase from 2000-01 to 2010-11 for all wines (+95%). Differences emerge across market segments: since 1990, some wines have grown more than others. Sparkling and bottled wines increased the most (Pomarici, 2016; del Rey, 2018) : bottled wines doubled from 1990-91 to 2000-01, and again from 2000-01 to 2010-11, while in 2015-16 it has grown by 9%. Bulk wine has tripled from 2000-01 to 2010-11 (Mariani et al., 2012) , while musts show a progressive downward trend after an increase from 1990-91 to 2000-01 (+23%). If we focus on 2015-16 (table 1), the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, China, and Canada are listed as top 5 for all wines and for bottled wine. It is worth noting that Germany, the UK, and the US have long been major destinations for wine exports, while Canada and China are the first traditional and non-traditional importing countries, respectively (Mariani et al., 2012) . Relevant importers of sparkling wine are Japan and Singapore (that overstep China and Canada). Germany, the UK, and the US are leaders in imports of bulk wine, followed by France and Sweden. Musts (not imported by Russian Federation, New Zealand, and Argentina) cover a relevant share of wine imports for Japan and European countries (Portugal, Germany, Italy, and France).
Global trade patterns have considerably changed over time (table 3) : trade between OWP has drastically reduced (from 65% to 27%, in 1996-2016) in favour of a relevant increase in imports of NWP (from 22% to 44% from OWP, and from 4% to 21% from NWP, in 1996 NWP, in -2016 . In 2016, global imports is absorbed by NWP for 65% and by North for 77% (UN Comtrade, 2017) . Changes in the relevance of countries' groups in global wine market are significant: NWP have gained increasing market shares, driven by North (e.g. the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand). Measures that are applied to protect human or animal life from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in their food; to protect human life from plant-or animal-carried diseases; to protect animal or plant life from pests, diseases, or disease-causing organisms; to prevent or limit other damage to a country from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; and to protect biodiversity.
A220
Restricted use of certain substances in food and feed and their contact materials
Restriction or prohibition on the use of certain substances contained in food and feed. It includes the restrictions on substances contained in the food containers that might migrate to food.
B Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs)
Measures referring to technical regulations, and procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards, excluding measures covered by the SPS Agreement.
B330
Packaging requirements Measures regulating the mode in which goods must be or cannot be packed, and defining the packaging materials to be used. B420
TBT regulations on transport and storage Requirements on certain conditions under which products should be stored and/or transported.
B830
Certification requirement Certification of conformity with a given regulation: required by the importing country but may be issued in the exporting or the importing country.
C Pre-Shipment inspections Compulsory quality, quantity and price control of goods prior to shipment from the exporting country, conducted by an independent inspecting agency mandated by the authorities of the importing country. C200 Direct consignment requirement Requirement that goods must be shipped directly from the country of origin, without stopping at a third country. C900
Other formalities, n.e.s. Other formalities not elsewhere specified. P Export-related measures Export-related measures are measures applied by the government of the exporting country on exported goods. P130
Licensing-or permit requirements to export A requirement to obtain a licence or a permit by the government of the exporting country to export products.
P500
Export taxes and charges Taxes collected on exported goods by the government of the exporting country: they can be set either on a specific or an ad valorem basis. P620
Certification required by the exporting country Requirement by the exporting country to obtain sanitary, phytosanitary or other certification before the goods are exported.
P690
Export measures, n.e.s. Export measures not elsewhere specified. Source: International Classification of Non-Tariff measures, February 2012 version (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2012/2).
Types of bilateral NTMs on wine imports differ across trade patterns (table 6). Bilateral NTMs implemented by NWP has more than tripled over time (from 157 to 540 in 1996-2016) (UNDCTA, 2017), while OWP, in general, adopt import tariffs rather than bilateral NTMs (Rickard et al., 2014 (Rickard et al., , 2017 Global Trade Alert, 2017 2 ). Governments have substantially increased the use of technical measures in order to protect domestic markets (Anderson and Golin, 2004) (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 2003; Fernandes et al., 2017) : the consequences may be detrimental in particular for trade from developing countries of NWP (e.g. Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, South Africa), which have to find alternative outlet to their production. 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In order to investigate the impact of bilateral non-tariff measures (NTMs) on global trade of wine, we use a standard gravity approach: bilateral trade flows are likely to be explained by economic masses, and by the economic distance between countries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) . Following Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) , we proxy economic masses of importing (i) and exporting (j) countries with importer (β i ) and exporter (β j ) fixed effects, so to account for multilateral trade resistance terms. The fixed effects capture size effects, and control for the country-specific unobserved heterogeneity (Cardamone, 2011) . We use time fixed effects (β t ) to control for time-specific events.
We model NTMs as dummy variables, equal to 1 if the NTM is in place (0 otherwise). The NTMs are time-specific (t), and related to the implementing country (i), the partner country (j), and the wine category (k) 3 :
( 1) where ln (X ij,k ) is the logarithm of (annual) imports of the k-th wine category between i and j, α is a constant, γ k is the parameter of interest, and ε is the error term.
We estimate the model in equation (1) using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator. The PPML estimator is widely adopted in gravity-based analyses of trade policies in the agri-food sector (e.g. Hoeckman and Nicita, 2011; Winchester et al., 2012; Beckman and Arita, 2016; Dal Bianco et al., 2016; Arita et al., 2017) . It allows us to deal with relevant econometric issues, peculiar of gravity-based models: the presence of zero trade flows and the heteroskedasticity in the error term (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) . By assuming an additive error, the PPML allows us to correct for heteroskedasticity and to avoid selection bias (due to exclusion of zero observations): the marginal effects tend to be more robust in terms of magnitude, as well as in term of statistical and economic significance (Haq et al., 2013) . We compute the marginal effects (ME) for the bilateral NTM as change in imports with (NTM(1)) and without (NTM(0)) the specific bilateral trade agreement:
We distinguish between net importers and net exporters in order to isolate potential differences in the effects of the bilateral NTMs on imports that may be due to the sign of the trade balance.
We use imports of four product categories, coded according to the Harmonised System (HS) 6-digit: 'wine, sparkling' (220410), 'wine, still, in containers holding 2 l or less' (220421), 'wine, still, in containers holding more than 2 l' (220429), 'grape must' (220430). We include all types of bilateral NTMs applied in wine sector (UNCTAD, 2012): Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs), pre-shipment inspections, and export-related measures. We collected bilateral annual data from the Global Database on Non-Tariff Measures for NTMs, and from the UN Comtrade database for imports. The dataset includes 24 countries (selected among the top importers, exporters and producers of wine), and cover data from 1991 to 2016.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We estimate a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) model, and compute the marginal effects of bilateral non-tariff measures (NTMs) on imports, in order to disentangle how different types of NTMs affect global trade of wine and of its segments (table 7) . Results suggest that the trade effects of bilateral NTMs are segment-specific, and differences emerge across types of NTMs. We find positive coefficients for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standard (SPS), pre-shipment inspection, and export-related measure: as expected, bilateral NTMs tend to facilitate global trade of wine. This is true, in particular, for SPSs: on average, the SPSs are the most influential on imports. Global imports also raise if export-related measures and pre-shipment inspections are implemented, but to a their impacts are not as large as those observed for the SPSs. Our results complement the findings of Dal Bianco et al. (2016), who focus on exports of wine. In particular, we found that SPSs enhance imports, while they found that they have no impact on exports (Dal Bianco et al., 2016) ; we found that technical measures have mixed effects on imports, while Dal Bianco et al. (2016) conclude that they are important frictions for exports.
As for the segment-specific analyses, we find that bilateral NTMs enhance trade, exception made for the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs), whose effects are segment-specific. Moreover, the SPSs and the export-related measures are trade-enhancing: SPSs greatly affect imports of bulk wine; export-related measures foster imports of grape must. The effects of pre-shipment inspections is mainly due to their positive effect on bottled wine. The TBTs impact bottled and bulk wine, but we the evidence are mixed: imports of bottled wine are favoured, while imports of bulk wine are frictioned. The differences we observe for bottled and bulk wine may be due to changes in the composition of import flows: during the last decades bulk wine has gained market shares to the detriment of those related to bottled wine (Castillo et al., 2016) . Large volumes of bulk wine are imported and bottled in the target market: it is plausible that, compared to bulk wine, bottled wine meets technical standards (e.g. packaging requirements, regulations on transport and storage, certification requirements) and, as a consequence, it is likely to have great imports. Our findings are specular to those of Dal Bianco et al. (2016) also for the TBTs: for bottled wine, they suggest that TBTs impede exports, and we show that TBTs favour imports.
We highlight how trade effects of NTMs differ for net importers and net exporters (table 8) .TBTs and pre-shipment inspections are implemented only by net importers. TBTs are trade-enhancing for bottled wine, but trade-impeding for bulk wine. The trade-impeding effect of TBTs for bulk wine of net importers may be due to the high specialisation of some competitors, that are net exporters of bulk wine (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, and Spain) (Mariani et al., 2012) . Pre-shipment inspections increase imports of bottled wine. SPSs are adopted only by net exporters, and increase imports of wine. Export-related measures do matter both for net importers and net exporters: they increase imports, especially for net exporters. Differently, the imports of musts of net exporters are not influenced by export-related measures.
Our results highlight that trade policy strategies are quite heterogeneous across countries. The net importers are frequent adopters of technical regulations (TBTs), and tend to impose formalities that should precede the shipments from exporting countries. The net exporters prefer measures aimed at ensuring food safety and preventing the dissemination of disease or pests (SPSs). Apart from specific differences, we may conclude that of the bilateral trade agreements are trade-enhancing, both for net importers and net exporters. 639 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 'No' signals the exclusion of regressors due to the lack of observations for specific measures in certain product categories between pairs of countries.
CONCLUSIONS
Changes in trade regulations have largely influenced agri-food markets (Arita et al., 2017) , and are modifying global trade of wine as well. The level of policy intervention (tariffs and non-tariff measures, NTMs) is remarkable in wine sector (Dal Bianco et al., 2016 ). The trends in the level of policy interventions seems to follow the pattern of global trade, with relevant changes in the relative importance of groups of countries (Mariani et al., 2012) . On top of a substantial regulation established through multilateral trade agreements, there has been a strong tendency to stipulate bilateral trade agreements: their impact on trade is not always clear, nor quantified at global scale. We assessed the effects of bilateral NTMs on global imports of wine, through a gravity model approach. We quantify the effects for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs), pre-shipment inspections, and export-related measures, and conclude on differences observed for the segments of the wine market (sparkling, bottled, bulk, musts).
We found that bilateral trade agreements favour trade: NTMs increase imports of wine. Moreover, we show that the effects of the SPSs are similar (and large) for all types of market segment (sparkling, bottled, and bulk). The export-related measures are trade-promoting. The TBTs favour (friction) bottled (bulk) wine. The pre-shipment inspections are relevant for bottled wine.
Our analysis represents a first attempt to quantify the impacts of bilateral trade agreements on trade of wine. Despite bilateral agreements are expected to be always pro-trade, we show that large differences exist across market segments and types of NTMs. The emphasis that we pose on this issue is beneficial for policymakers and entrepreneurs.
